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[The purpose of this article is to consider a peculiar type of will known in equity as 
a mutual will. The major focus is a consideration of the interplay of the legal effect 
of mutual wills and the practical use of such wills. It is hoped that this discussion 
will assist legal practitioners in identifying those clients who may benefit from 
executing mutual wills, identifying those clients who might intend to execute mutual 
wills, advising clients as to the pros and cons of mutual wills and the benefits of 
accompanying such wills with a deed or contract.] 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this article is to consider a peculiar type of will known in equity as a 
mutual will and, in particular, to explore the benefits and pitfalls of using such 
wills. It appears from the author’s research that while some legal practitioner’s 
often draft mutual wills, others avoid advising clients to use such wills for fear of 
their uncertain legal effect. This article is particularly directed at the latter group of 
practitioners and will hopefully place them in a more informed position when 
deciding whether to advise their clients as to the suitability of mutual wills. Solici-
tors that have experience in drafting mutual wills will also be assisted by the discus-
sion of factors that might indicate that a client intends their wills to be mutual wills 
and the checklist of factors detailed at the end of the article that should be consid-
ered when drafting any side agreement/deed to accompany the mutual will. Fur-
thermore, the relevance of the discussion of topics such as severing joint tenancies 
and testator family maintenance legislation is not confined to the context of mutual 
wills and are matters that all legal practitioners working in the area of wills and 
succession need to be mindful. 
To appreciate the benefits and pitfalls of mutual wills it is necessary to begin with a 
basic understanding of the legal effect of such wills. While this has been explored 
in detail in the text by the author MUTUAL WILLS (2000), the most crucial attribute 
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of mutual wills is their legally binding nature. A party to a mutual wills agreement 
is bound not to revoke his/her will in their lifetime without notifying the other party 
and thereby giving the other party the opportunity to revoke their own will.1 More-
over, once one party to the mutual wills agreement dies leaving his or her will 
unrevoked, equity intervenes and treats the agreement as irrevocable.2  
As mutual wills are binding, the key purpose of such wills is to ensure that property 
flows to intended, agreed, beneficiaries. They are generally used to ensure that a 
testator’s property can be enjoyed by another during his or her lifetime, but then 
passes to a third party, the ‘ultimate beneficiary.’ They may also be used to ensure 
that a testator’s interest in jointly owned property passes to a third party beneficiary, 
not the other joint owner. Who may benefit from mutual wills is discussed below. 
Moreover, some of the issues pertaining to joint property, such as severing joint 
tenancies, are discussed in more detail below.  
In effecting these purposes, equity is concerned with preventing fraud.3  Disputes 
pertaining to mutual wills fall “[u]nder the equitable jurisdiction for the prevention 
of fraud”.4 The fraud has been expressed by some courts as the survivor, the second 
testator, taking the benefit under the first testator’s will and the second testator then 
abrogating the trust embodied in his or her own will by revoking that will.5 The 
second testator acts fraudulently if he/she attempts to take the benefit under the first 
testator’s will without the burden attaching to it. Alternatively, and preferably, the 
fraud is the second testator allowing the first testator to die in the belief that the 
second testator would comply with the terms of the agreement and the second 
testator then subsequently disposes of his or her property other than in accordance 
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with the agreement.6 Under this view, the second testator does not have to benefit 
under the first testator’s will.7 The crucial element is that the first testator has acted 
to his or her detriment by exercising the power of testamentary disposition in the 
agreed manner and as a consequence the second testator should not act contrary to 
the mutual wills agreement. 
 
II WHO WILL BENEFIT FROM EXECUTING MUTUAL WILLS? 
There will be a number of circumstances when testators will be particularly con-
cerned to ensure that their property passes in the manner they intend. The most 
common category is persons whom remarry and have children from a previous 
marriage. In such circumstances they may wish to make provision for their new 
spouse, but also intend their property to ultimately flow to the children of the first 
marriage. They might therefore decide that they wish their new spouse to enjoy the 
testator’s property or his/her interest in joint property during the new spouse’s 
lifetime. It will be seen this may be affected through a life tenancy or the conferral 
of an absolute interest on the surviving spouse. Equally, though the testator may 
wish that his/her property pass to his/her children once the new spouse dies. Subject 
to the surviving spouse not breaching the mutual wills agreement, discussed in 
more detail below, mutual wills can be used to ensure that the testator’s children 
from the previous marriage are the ultimate beneficiaries of such property.  
Alternatively, the testator may simply wish that his/her estate pass to the testator’s 
children from the previous marriage without conferring any interest on the new 
spouse. Mutual wills will be particularly relevant in such circumstances when 
property is jointly owned. Thus in Smeaton v. Pattison,8 a non-mutual wills case, 
the testator wished for his interest in jointly owned property to pass to his children, 
rather than his new wife.9  The solicitor drafting the will was held to be liable to the 
children as a failure to sever the joint tenancy meant that the property devolved to 
the new wife.10  Mutual wills can ensure property passes in the intended manner, 
rather than passing to the joint owner through the law of survivorship. While it is 
suggested below that in such a situation it is best practice to sever the joint tenancy 
in the testator’s lifetime, the effect of the mutual wills is to sever any joint tenancy, 
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  Dufour v. Pereira, (1769) 21 ER 332, 333; 1 Dick 419, 421; 2 Harg Jurid Arg 304, 308 and 310-311; 
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Proctor v. Dale, [1994] Ch 31, 38 and 42, 48 and 49; [1993] 3 WLR 652, 656, 659-660, 665 and 666;  
Osborne v. Osborne, [2001] VSCA 228, paras 24-25 (Victorian Court of Appeal, 2001). 
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  [2002] QSC 431; [2003] QCA 341.  
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 [2002] QSC 431, para 39; [2003] QCA 341. 
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creating a tenancy in common,11 and the second testator holds, inter alia, the first 
testator’s property on trust for the beneficiaries of the mutual wills.12  
Blended families are not the only clients who may benefit from mutual wills. A 
testator may simply wish that their estate pass to a particular beneficiary, rather than 
their spouse or a joint tenant. Thus in Osborne v. Osborne13 the testator and testatrix 
were concerned that their property pass to their two sons, rather than each other. 14 
While the courts ultimately held the subject wills were not mutual wills because 
there was no clear contract / agreement not to revoke the wills,15 the case provides 
an example of the variety of concerns that might be promulgated through mutual 
wills. Similarly in Carr-Glynn v. Frearsons,16 again a case not involving mutual 
wills, the testatrix wished to bequeath to her niece property that the testatrix held 
with her nephew as joint tenants. The solicitor drafting the will was held liable to 
the niece because the failure to sever the joint tenancy meant that the property 
devolved to the joint tenant rather than as the testatrix had instructed. While again it 
is suggested below that in such a situation the joint tenancy should have been sev-
ered in the testator’s lifetime, as noted above, the effect of the mutual wills is to 
sever any joint tenancy, creating a tenancy in common.17 Thus mutual wills may be 
used to ensure an interest in joint property devolves in the manner intended by the 
testator/testatrix. 
A person who is in a relationship which is not recognised in law as constituting a 
marriage may be particularly concerned that their partner is provided for when they 
die. Laws governing the devolution of property on the death of one party to a le-
gally recognised marriage may be inapplicable to, for example, gay couples. Such 
couples may, therefore, be concerned to ensure that their property devolves to their 
partner under the terms of a will, rather than to other family members under intes-
tacy laws.  
As the decision in Barns v. Barns18 indicates, mutual wills may also be used in a bid 
to avoid testator family maintenance legislation. While in that case a majority of the 
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  [1999] Ch 326. See also Schofield v. Watts, unreported, 5 October 1999, (District Court of Queen-
sland, 1999). 
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  In re Wilford’s Estate, (1879) 11 Ch D 267, 269; Re Heys, [1914] P 192, 194 and 195-196; Gould v. 
Kemp, (1834) 2 My & K 304, 309 and 310; ER 959, 961 and 962; Re Hagger, [1930] 2 Ch 190, 195; Re 
Kerr, [1948] 3 DLR 668, 678; Clausen v. Denson, [1958] NZLR 572, 579; Szabo v. Boros, (1966) 60 
DLR (2d) 186, 189-190; (1967) 64 DLR (2d) 48, 49-50 and 52-53; Re Gillespie, [1968] 3 DLR (3d) 317,  
321 and 322.  
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High Court held that the subject mutual wills and deed did not have the effect of 
preventing the application of the Inheritance (Family Provisions) Act, 1972 (SA), 
mutual wills continue to have a role in this context despite the decision. It is con-
tended below that the decision is erroneous and is based on a misconception of the 
legal effect of mutual wills. Moreover, such legislation has its limitations and inter 
vivos arrangements are still effective to avoid the legislation unless the particular 
Act expressly extends to such transactions. As discussed below, mutual wills can be 
combined with inter vivos transfers of property and thus can still limit the applica-
tion of testator family maintenance legislation. 
 
III IDENTIFYING CLIENTS WHO INTEND THEIR WILLS                             
TO OPERATE AS MUTUAL WILLS 
Solicitors who are instructed to draft wills must be open to the notion that his/her 
client might be intending their wills to operate as mutual wills. There are undoubt-
edly going to be cases where clients will seek to ensure their property devolves 
according to the terms of what is known in equity as mutual wills, without ex-
pressly conveying such to their solicitor. This will of course lead to problems on the 
death of either or both testator/testatrix if the wills are challenged in the courts on 
the basis that they are not mutual wills. A failure to draft the wills with a clear 
statement that they are intended to be irrevocable and/or a failure to sever any joint 
tenancies may in turn leave a solicitor open to claims of negligence. It is now well 
established that solicitors drafting wills owe a duty of care, not only to the client, 
but the intended beneficiaries.19 As noted above, in, inter alia, Smeaton v. Patti-
son
20
 and Carr-Glynn v. Frearsons21 the solicitors drafting the subject wills were 
held to be liable to the intended beneficiaries when failing to sever the joint tenancy 
meant that instead the property devolved to the joint tenant. The courts have held 
that such a claim may be made brought by the deceased estate or the disappointed 
beneficiary.22 There is no reason why a failure to draft an effective mutual will will 
not also attract such liability.  
Moreover, equally relevant in the context of mutual wills is the general principle 
that a practitioner’s duty includes providing reasonable assistance with the signing 
and attestation of the will. Particularly in the context of mutual wills, it is important 
to ensure that wills are properly attested. The solicitor should not simply draft the 
wills and send them to the clients for attesting. In Esterhuizen v. Allied Dunbar 
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  Hill v Van Erp, (1997) 188 CLR 159 (High Court of Australia, 1997); Schofield v. Watts, unreported 
decision of District Court of Queensland, 5 October 1999; Smeaton v. Pattison [2002] QSC 431 (Su-
preme Court of Queensland, 2002); [2003] QCA 341 (Queensland Court of Appeal, 2003). See also in 
the English context:  White v. Jones, [1995] 2 AC 207 House of Lords, 1995); Carr-Glynn v. Frearsons,  
[1999] Ch 326 (Eng. C.A. 1999). 
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  [1999] Ch 326.  
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Assurance PLC23 Longmore J asserted that it is “not enough just to leave written 
instructions with the testator. In ordinary circumstances just to leave written instruc-
tions and to do no more not only would be contrary to good practice but also in my 
view negligent.” Rather, precedent provides that the solicitor should ensure the 
client attests the document(s) in the solicitor’s office or the solicitor should attend 
the client’s home to ensure the document(s) is properly attested. These sentiments 
are applicable to the wills themselves and any related documentation, such as that 
pertaining to a severance of joint tenancy or deed. 
Given the importance of identifying clients that intend to execute mutual wills, 
there are a number of factors that legal practitioners should be mindful of, alerting 
them that their client might intend to execute mutual wills. At the most general 
level, the mere fact a client has consulted the solicitor to prepare a will and, in 
particular, to revoke a former will and execute a new will should alert the practitio-
ner that the client has a serious issue of concern. Smeaton v. Pattison24 is instructive 
in this regard, the court placing great weight on the fact the client contacted the 
solicitor with the express intention of executing a new will. This indicated to the 
court the importance the client placed on ensuring his property devolved in the 
manner he intended.25 This was also held to be important in Carr-Glynn v. Frear-
sons.
26
 Such sentiments are particularly applicable in the context of mutual wills.  
The terms of instructions may also indicate the client intends to execute a mutual 
will. Particularly in the context of a married couple, if the instructions indicate that 
property is to devolve otherwise than absolutely to the surviving spouse this may be 
indicative of a wish to execute mutual wills. If, as in Osborne v. Osborne27 and 
Proctor v. Dale,28 the testator and testatrix bequeath their property to their children, 
rather than each other, then this may evidence a wish to execute mutual wills and 
the solicitor should make further inquiries into the parties’ wishes. Irregardless of 
whether the wills are intended to be mutual wills, in this context it will again be 
important to sever any joint tenancy to ensure that the testator’s wishes are effective 
and the property devolves to the intended beneficiaries, rather than through the law 
of survivorship. Equally if, as in Dufour v. Pereira,29 Re Hagger30  and Swain v. 
Mewburn,31 the testator and testatrix bequeath only a life tenancy to the survivor 
and then to, for example, one party’s children or relatives, this will be indicative of 
a wish to execute mutual wills and the solicitor should again make further inquiries 
into the parties’ wishes.  
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  [1998] 2 FLR 668, 677. 
24
  [2002] QSC 431; [2003] QCA 341, para 27. 
25
  [2002] QSC 431; [2003] QCA 341, para 27. 
26
  [1999] Ch 326, 335-336. 
27
  [2000] VSC 95; [2001] VSCA 228, paras 24-25. Note, however, that the courts in that case disagreed 
and held the wills not to be mutual wills. 
28
  [1994] Ch 31, 38 and 42, 48 and 49.  
29
  (1769) 21 ER 332.  
30
  [1930] 2 Ch 190.  
31
  Unreported, WASC, No 36 of 1993, 17 February 1994, 11.  
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The corollary, however, is that mutual wills are less likely to be intended when an 
absolute interest is conferred on the surviving spouse. As Oldham J explained in Re 
Oldham32: 
Of course it is a strong thing that these two parties came together, agreed 
to make their wills in identical terms and in fact so made them. But that 
does not go nearly enough. If the spouses intended to do what the plaintiff 
suggests, it is difficult to see why the mutual wills gave the survivor an ab-
solute interest in the whole of the property of the one who died first . . . 
Could these parties have acted as they did with any other object or intent 
than the plaintiff asserts? It is impossible to deny that they could. 
Consequently, the court held the wills were not mutual wills because they conferred 
an absolute interest upon the second testator and that was inconsistent with the 
obligations imposed under mutual wills.33  
That is not to say that mutual wills cannot confer an absolute interest on the surviv-
ing spouse. The wills in Birmingham v. Renfrew34 conferred an absolute interest on 
the surviving spouse. In such cases care will be needed to ensure that some other 
factor, such as a blended family, indicates an intention for mutual wills. As there is 
a strong presumption in such a case that the wills were not intended as mutual 
wills,35 any intention to execute mutual wills must be made clear in the wills and 
any accompanying contract or deed.  
The nature of the property, particularly the devolution of jointly owned property to 
a person other than the other joint owner, may also indicate an intention to execute 
mutual wills. In regard to jointly owned property there are two further related points 
that must be borne in mind. First, the solicitor drafting a will has a duty to deter-
mine if any of the testator’s property is jointly held so that, where necessary, any 
joint tenancy can be severed. There will of course be cases where the solicitor 
knows the legal status of the testator’s property because he/she or their firm may 
have acted for the client in the relevant conveyance.36  However, in the absence of 
such knowledge it is important for the solicitor preparing the will to determine if 
property is held as joint tenants or tenants in common. Legal practitioners cannot 
expect a layperson, who may not understand the difference in the nature of the title 
much less its legal significance, to advise them as to the nature of the ownership of 
property.  
Second, where the mutual wills agreement involves joint property devolving to a 
third party beneficiary the solicitor should ensure any joint tenancy is severed. 
There are two reasons for this. While the better view is that equity will sever the 
                                                            
32
  Re Oldham, [1925] 1 Ch 75, 87-88 (Eng. Chancery Division of the High Court, 1924). See also 
Birmingham v. Renfrew, (1937) 57 CLR 666, 674; Osborne v. Osborne, [2001] VSCA 228, para 28; 
Baird v. Smee, [2000] NSWCA 253, paras 8 and 10 (New South Wales Court of Appeal, 2000). 
33
  [1925] 1 Ch 75, 87. 
34
  Birmingham v. Renfrew, (1937) 57 CLR 666. 
35
  Re Oldham, [1925] 1 Ch 75, 87-88. See also Birmingham v. Renfrew, (1937) 57 CLR 666, 674; 
Osborne v. Osborne, [2001] VSCA 228, para 28; Baird v. Smee, [2000] NSWCA 253, paras 8 and 10. 
36
  As in Carr-Glynn v. Frearsons, [1999] Ch 326, 331. 
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joint tenancy in the case of mutual wills, 37 the Australian courts have not deter-
mined the matter. It is also unclear from the Canadian and English cases whether 
there is a severance in both law and equity. If the severance is only in equity, legal 
title will pass to the survivor under the law of survivorship, but equity will impose a 
trust in favour of the beneficiaries under the mutual wills agreement.38  This might 
prove problematic if the survivor in turn decides to breach that trust. Further, if for 
any reason the wills are held not to be mutual wills it will be crucial that any joint 
tenancy has been severed because, as discussed above, the solicitor will be liable in 
negligence if the will he or she has drafted purports to devolve property to a per-
son(s) other than the joint tenant where the joint tenancy has not been severed. 39 In 
this regard it is pertinent to note that in Carr-Glynn v. Frearsons40 the court stressed 
that some urgency must attach to this issue when the testatrix is elderly to ensure 
the joint tenancy is severed before her death. In that case the testatrix was 81 years 
of age when she made her will.41  
This last point leads to another indicia of an intention to execute mutual wills, the 
age of the parties. That this might be indicative is supported by the decision in 
Swain v. Mewburn,42 In determining in that case that the subject wills were mutual 
wills the court placed great emphasis on the age of the testators (in their fifties), the 
period of their marriage (almost 20 years) and the unlikeliness of the parties remar-
rying. Similarly in Baird v. Smee43 Mason P acknowledged that the “couple were at 
least middle-aged” might be indicative of mutual wills and that mutual wills “might 
be appropriate in the case of an elderly married couple wishing to settle their affairs 
in the same way before they die.” Thus the older the client the more likely that they 
might be prepared to enter into a binding arrangement as the will that is being 
drafted is realistically intended to be their last will. 
 
IV ADVISING CLIENTS ON THE ADVANTAGES AND 
DISADVANTAGES OF MUTUAL WILLS 
When advising clients as to the advantages and disadvantages of mutual wills 
and/or any accompanying contract or deed it is important that they understand that 
the legal arrangements are prima facie irrevocable. It may be awkward, but in the 
course of such discussions it is important to have the clients consider what they 
                                                            
37
  In re Wilford’s Estate, (1879) 11 Ch D 267, 269; Re Heys, [1914] P 192, 194 and 195-196; Gould v. 
Kemp, (1834) 2 My & K 304, 309 and 310; ER 959, 961 and 962; Re Hagger, [1930] 2 Ch 190, 195; Re 
Kerr, [1948] 3 DLR 668, 678; Clausen v. Denson, [1958] NZLR 572, 579; Szabo v. Boros, (1966) 60 
DLR (2d) 186, 189-190; (1967) 64 DLR (2d) 48, 49-50 and 52-53; Re Gillespie, [1968] 3 DLR (3d) 317,  
321 and 322.  
38
  See further JULIE CASSIDY, MUTUAL WILLS 61-65 (2000). 
39
  Carr-Glynn v. Frearsons[1999] Ch 326; Schofield v. Watts, unreported decision of District Court of 
Queensland, 5 October 1999; Smeaton v. Pattison, [2002] QSC 431; [2003] QCA 341.  
40
  [1999] Ch 326, 331. 
41
  [1999] Ch 326, 331. See also Amanda Stickley, A beneficiary’s cruellest cut – a failure to unilaterally 
sever a joint tenancy, 14(6) AUSTRALIAN P.L.B. 55, 56 (1999). 
42
  Unreported decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia, 3 March 1994, 9 
and 12. 
43
  [2000] NSWCA 253, paras 9 and 17. 
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wish to happen if, for example, they divorce and/or remarry. While this will be 
particularly so when the clients are young enough for this to be quite realistic, as the 
facts in Osborne v. Osborne44 indicate, the possibility of remarriage is something to 
be mindful even when the testators are in their 70’s.  
The issue of irrevocability will be particularly important where the mutual wills 
agreement is combined with an inter vivos transfer of property. It will be seen 
below that to avoid testator family maintenance legislation parties might decide to 
make an inter vivos transfer of what would otherwise be part of the deceased’s 
estate. The clients must understand that the transfer is irrevocable and the recipi-
ent’s interest in that property is absolute in the absence of any express restrictions.  
Moreover, while the mutual wills agreement or deed might seek to limit the recipi-
ent’s enjoyment of the property, if this is intended the agreement must be very 
clear. Again Osborne v. Osborne45 is factually instructive. The plaintiff had asserted 
that his parents had executed mutual wills. As a consequence, it was contended that 
when his father gifted the family home (‘the unit’) to his new spouse after the death 
of the plaintiff’s mother, his father had breached the mutual wills. As noted above, 
the courts held the wills not to be mutual wills and as a consequence a caveat the 
plaintiff placed over the subject unit for the duration of the litigation, was ordered 
to be removed. The new spouse, the recipient of the gifted unit, mortgaged the 
property on two occasions and ultimately, through the first mortgagors, sold the 
unit. This was so even though the gift of the unit had been conditional on her enter-
ing into a Deed of Family Arrangement and executing a will bequeathing the unit to 
certain members of the Osborne family.46 Subsequent to the first mortgage, in the 
course of refusing an application to stay the orders of the court at first instance, 47 
Beach J asserted that even life tenant, such as the new spouse, was entitled to mort-
gage the property.  In later proceedings, brought by one of the intended beneficiar-
ies under the Deed of Family Arrangement and the will of the new spouse, the new 
spouse pleaded that she was the absolute owner of the unit that had been gifted to 
her and that any obligations pertaining to that property under the Deed of Family 
Arrangement ceased when the donor, Mr Osborne, died. The proceedings against 
the new spouse were ultimately discontinued. Thus despite the deed the unit was 
mortgaged and ultimately sold by the new spouse. Thus if a life interest or an abso-
lute interest in property is to be conveyed through an inter vivos transfer it is impor-
tant to clearly draft any restrictions that apply to the property. In particular, any 
restrictions, such as the ability to sell or mortgage the property, must be clear. 
The discussion of this case highlights the unfortunate reality that ultimately, if a 
surviving spouse wants to, he/she may undermine a mutual wills agreement. It is 
important that clients be aware of this fact. While they may trust their spouse, that 
person might subsequently remarry and want to make provision for their new part-
                                                            
44
  [2000] VSC 95, para 1. In that case the surviving spouse remarried in his late 70’s and gifted the 
property the subject of a mutual wills claim to his new spouse subject to a Deed of Family Arrangement: 
[2000] VSC 95, para 8. 
45
  [2000] VSC 95; [2001] VSCA 228. 
46
  [2000] VSC 95; [2001] VSCA 228, paras 24-25.  
47
  [2001] VSC 95, para 24.  
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ner. Family members may pressure them into breaching the agreement so that they 
benefit. It may be that the spouse always intended to breach the agreement.  
A well-drafted contract or deed accompanying the mutual wills will lessen the 
chances of a breach. From a practical point of view, however, the breach needs to 
be discovered in time for it to be rectified. Over a period of time the surviving 
spouse who benefits under the will of the first to die may deliberately diminish 
his/her estate through systematic withdrawals of funds or gifts. Secretly mortgaging 
or selling property the subject of a mutual wills agreement may also be effective to 
dispossess the recipient of the relevant property even in the face of an iron clad 
agreement. As Callinan J warned in Barns v. Barns,48 the “fact that the surviving 
contracting party, who is the beneficiary under the will of the first of the two to die, 
may use, and indeed even ultimately use up in their entirety the assets passing under 
the first will, provides a reminder that in human affairs, even in legal affairs, perfec-
tion, and the complete effectuation of intention are sometimes not possible.” These 
issues are discussed in more detail below. 
 
V RECOGNISING POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH SECOND 
MARRIAGES, BLENDED FAMILIES AND OTHER FAMILY ISSUES 
The relevance of mutual wills in blended families has already been addressed 
above. As, however, this context raises issues that are peculiar to their context it is 
pertinent to return to this factual scenario.  
Today it is common for legal practitioners to have clients who have remarried and 
may have children from a former marriage. Blended families pose difficult issues 
for practitioners who may feel disinclined to ask awkward questions, but who also 
have to be mindful of their obligations to their clients, outlined above, and the 
potential liability they face from disappointed beneficiaries. For example, where a 
client is bequeathing their entire estate to a surviving spouse, it may be awkward, 
but the client should be asked whether they intend to make any provision for his/her 
children. It is important that the client be advised that on its own such a bequest 
places the surviving spouse under no legal obligation to pass that property to the 
first testator’s children. Clients may be happy to trust their surviving spouse to act 
in the manner they intended. Others, however, once properly advised, may feel that 
they want more than a moral obligation to ensure the property devolves to their 
children. Thus mutual wills and, perhaps a contract or deed, discussed below, might 
serve such clients’ wishes. 
This is particularly so where a new spouse is not prepared to accept a mere life 
tenancy under the terms of the will of the first to die. Research indicates that today 
spouses are not happy to be bequeathed life tenancies in property, but rather de-
mand the conferral of an absolute interest in bequeathed property. A life tenancy is 
not seen as an adequate conferral of benefit. Again, bequeathing an absolute interest 
in property without a legally binding restriction is risky when the first testator in 
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reality only intends the survivor to enjoy the property in his/her lifetime, with an 
obligation to pass property to the ultimate beneficiaries, for example, their children.  
Even where the will only confers a life tenancy on the surviving spouse, the same 
problem may arise where there has been a failure to sever any joint tenancy. Even 
though the first testator’s will may only confer a life interest on the surviving 
spouse, the property may nevertheless devolve to the surviving spouse through the 
law of survivorship if the joint tenancy has not been severed. Despite the terms of 
the will, in such a case the surviving spouse will have acquired an absolute interest 
in the property and only moral obligations will ensure it is bequeathed to the ulti-
mate intended beneficiaries. Thus in Schofield v. Watts49 the testator had made 
provision in his will for his wife to be maintained for her lifetime and the residue 
was to pass to his brothers and sisters. However, as relevant joint tenancies were not 
severed the property passed to his wife absolutely, contrary to his intentions and 
instructions. The solicitors were held liable to the intended beneficiaries for their 
negligent failure to sever the joint tenancy. 
Where a mutual wills agreement is entered into limiting the survivor’s enjoyment of 
property, it is important that the ultimate beneficiaries know of the agreement. If the 
surviving spouse proposes to breach the mutual wills agreement, the beneficiaries 
may, for example, seek injunctive relief.50 If the surviving spouse makes inter vivos 
gifts in breach of the mutual wills agreement, 51 the beneficiaries will be entitled to 
disgorge the volunteer of the property.52 Equally if the surviving spouse revokes 
his/her will and makes a testamentary disposition contrary to the mutual wills, the 
beneficiaries will have a claim in equity.53 They may enforce the arrangement 
without facing any privity hurdles as they are enforcing the trust, rather than the 
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  Unreported decision of District Court of Queensland, 5 October 1999. See also Osborne v. Osborne, 
[2000] VSC 95 para 1 (Supreme Court of Victoria, 2000) where the surviving spouse acquired the unit 
by survivorship despite the terms of the testatrix’s will. 
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  Schaefer v. Schuhmann, [1972] AC 572, 586 (Privy Council, 1971).  
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  Gregor v. Kemp, (1722) 36 ER 926, 926 and 927 (Eng. Chancery Division of the High Court, 1722); 
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(1993) 32 NSWLR 574, 578 (New South Wales Court of Appeal, 1993); Re Goodchild, [1996] 1 WLR 
694, 700.  
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  Chamberlaine v. Chamberlaine, (1680) 22 ER 1053; Gregor v. Kemp, (1722) 36 ER 926; Lord 
Walpole v Lord Orford, (1797) 3 Ves 402; Ch 38; (1799) 2 Harg Jurid Arg 294-295; Legard v. Hodges, 
(1792) 30 ER 447, 447; (1792) 1 Ves Jun 477-478 (Eng. C.A. 1792); Synge v. Synge, [1894] 1 QB 466, 
470-471 (Eng. C.A. 1894); Hoeppner v. Kautz, (1908) 8 SR (NSW) 186 (Supreme Court of New South 
Wales, 1908); Re Syme, [1933] VLR 282 (Supreme Court of Victoria, 1933); Birmingham v. Renfrew, 
(1937) 57 CLR 666, 685, 687 and 688; Reynolds v. Marshall, [1952] NZLR 384; Macadam v. Wright, 
[1958] Ch 168, 176, 179 and 181 (Eng. C.A. 1958); Szabo v. Boros, (1967) 64 DLR (2d) 48, 53; Palmer 
v. Bank of NSW, [1973] 2 NSWLR 244, 248-249 (New South Wales Supreme Court, 1973); Staib v. 
Powell, [1979] Qd R 151 (Supreme Court of Queensland, 1979); Bigg v Queensland Trustees Ltd., 
[1990] 2 Qd R 11, 13. 
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  Gregor v. Kemp, (1722) 36 ER 926, 926 and 927; Fortescue v. Hennah, (1812) 34 ER 443, 445 (Eng 
C.A. 1812); Jones v. Martin (1798) 2 ER 1184, 1199-1200 (Eng. C.A.  1798); Synge v. Synge, [1894] 1 
QB 466; In re Gardner, [1920] 2 Ch 523, 529 (Eng. Chancery Division of the High Court, 1920); Re 
Kerr, [1948] 3 DLR 668, 679; Re Green, [1951] Ch 148 (Eng. Chancery Division of the High Court); 
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Bank of NSW, (1975) 133 CLR 150, 159 (High Court of Australia, 1975); Bigg v. Queensland Trustees 
Ltd., [1990] 2 Qd R 11, 13 and 17. 
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agreement between the parties.54 These remedies may, however, be fruitless if the 
ultimate beneficiaries are not aware of the mutual wills agreement. 
 
VI ARE THEY EFFECTIVE POST BARNS V BARNS                              
AND “NOTIONAL ESTATE” PROVISIONS? 
A full consideration of the decision in Barns v. Barns55 is beyond the scope of this 
article, nevertheless some key point about the decision can be made in this context. 
As noted above, in Barns v. Barns56 a majority of the High Court held that the 
subject mutual wills and deed did not have the effect of preventing the application 
of the Inheritance (Family Provisions) Act, 1972 (SA). Ultimately it is submitted 
that despite the decision mutual wills continue to have an important role in testa-
mentary planning.  
First, and perhaps most importantly, it is contended that the decision is erroneous 
and is based on a misunderstanding of the legal effect of mutual wills. To this end 
the dissenting view of Callinan J is to be preferred. Callinan J stresses that mutual 
wills should not be treated differently from any other disposition / contractual 
obligation that would place property outside the scope of the deceased’s estate and 
thus beyond the reach of the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act, 1972 (SA).57 This 
view is in turn based on a correct understanding of the timing of the effect of mu-
tual wills. As Callinan J states, the obligations under the mutual wills agreement 
impact on the first testator,58 not only on the survivor as Gummow and Hayne JJ 
erroneously state.59 In support of this view it suffices to note that an actionable 
breach of the mutual wills agreement may occur even when both parties are alive.60 
Moreover, the beneficiaries under the mutual wills derive their rights from the 
enforcement of the trust stemming from the agreement, rather than the second 
testator’s will.61 Thus the mutual wills agreement is effective earlier than that sug-
gested by the majority justices and thus impacts upon the deceased’s estate in the 
manner suggested by Callinan J. 
Also relevant to the decision’s authoritative value is the fact that there is no clear 
majority. Gleeson CJ, with whom Kirby J agreed, in essence concluded that to give 
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  Dufour v. Pereira, (1769) 2 Harg Jurid Arg 304, 310-311; Hudson v. Gray, (1927) 39 CLR 473, 484 
(High Court of Australia, 1927); Birmingham v. Renfrew, [1937] VLR 180, 189 (Supreme Court of 
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effect to the legislation’s purpose, mutual wills have to be treated differently from 
other contractual obligations that would otherwise place the subject property out-
side the deceased’s estate and thus the legislation’s reach.62 As noted above, Gum-
mow and Hayne JJ held that as mutual wills only impact on the survivor and the 
court’s order under the Act operates as a codicil on the deceased’s will, the mutual 
wills obligations were antecedent the court’s determination regarding the de-
ceased’s estate.63 They also suggested that the legislation impacts on the deceased’s 
gross, not net estate.64 As discussed below, Gleeson CJ (with who Kirby J agreed) 
clearly disagreed with this view. As noted above, Callinan J believed the mutual 
wills agreement effected a disposition / contractual obligation that placed property 
outside the scope of the deceased’s estate and thus beyond the reach of the Inheri-
tance (Family Provision) Act, 1972 (SA).65 He believed it was for the legislature, 
not the courts, to extend the reach of the Act to such dispositions.66 Thus in a sense 
the court was divided: 2:2:1. 
Second, the case was very much based on its facts and thus may be distinguished. 
Gleeson CJ, with whom Kirby J agreed, stressed that on the facts the testator and 
his spouse were only concerned from excluding their daughter from the estate of the 
survivor, not the first to die.67 If a contrary intention was established, perhaps 
Gleeson CJ would have held otherwise and the property could have been effectively 
removed from the deceased’s estate.  
Third, Gleeson CJ, with whom Kirby J agreed, acknowledged that the Inheritance 
(Family Provision) Act, 1972 (SA) has its limitations. Gleeson CJ stressed that 
contractual obligations and inter vivos arrangements are still effective to avoid the 
legislation unless the particular Act expressly extends to such transactions, as is the 
case under the Family Provision Act, 1982 (NSW).68 As discussed above, mutual 
wills can be combined with inter vivos transfers of property. However, as also 
warned above, care must be taken with such inter vivos transactions if it is intended 
that the recipient should not have full enjoyment of the property and/or be bound to 
bequeath the property to the ultimate beneficiaries. 
Barns v. Barns69 did not consider the extended reach of the Succession Act, 1981 
(Qld) or the “notional estate” provisions of the Family Provision Act, 1982 
(NSW).70 These legislative enactments deal with the issue of pre-death dispositions 
of property in two very different ways. In Queensland the Succession Act, 1981, 
s 41(12) (Qld) provides that property the subject of a donatio mortis causa71 gift is 
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  [2003] HCA 9, para 34. See also Kirby J, para 129.  
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  [2003] HCA 9, paras 82, 84, 94 and 108. 
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  [2003] HCA 9, paras 105 and 106. 
65
  [2003] HCA 9, paras 140, 161 and 166. 
66
  [2003] HCA 9, paras 132, 159 and 171. 
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  A donatio mortis causa is an inter vivos gift, but it is made in contemplation of death and conditional 
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to be treated as part of the testator’s estate for the purposes of the family provision 
legislation.  
The New South Wales legislation deals with the issue in a much broader manner by 
including the testator’s “notional estate” in the property that may be the subject of a 
family provision order.72 The court has a discretion to designate property as “no-
tional estate” where it has been the subject of a “prescribed transaction” within 
s 22(1) of the Act. A “prescribed transaction” occurs if through any act or omission 
the testator’s property becomes owned by another person or subject to a trust and 
full valuable consideration has not been paid for the property. In addition to this 
general definition, the Act specifies that a number of particular acts constitute pre-
scribed transactions.73 These include failing to prevent property passing under 
survivorship and the failure to extinguish a trust held over property.  
If the testator has entered into a prescribed transaction the court may make an order 
designating property as notional estate in three circumstances:74  
• if the transaction took effect within three years of the testator’s death 
and was entered into with the object of partly or wholly preventing a 
person making a claim for provision; 
• if the transaction took effect within one year of the testator’s death and 
was entered into when the testator had a moral obligation to make 
provision for an eligible person; or 
• if the transaction took effect after the testator’s death. 
An order designating property as notional estate may not be made unless, inter alia, 
there is no, or insufficient, actual estate out of which provision for the claimant may 
be made.75  
Under s 23, in certain cases the court can make an order designating property as 
notional estate even if that property was not the subject of the prescribed transac-
tion. Thus, under s 23, if the recipient of the purported gift sold the property, the 
court may designate other property owned by that person to be notional estate. In 
this way this legislation may be used by a claimant under the Family Provision Act, 
1982 (NSW) to reverse attempts by the testator and / or recipients of a gift, to defeat 
his or her claim by making inter vivos and testamentary gifts.  
This legislation certainly constrains the ability to pass property through mutual 
wills agreements, even when accompanied by inter vivos transactions. However, as 
will be apparent from the above discussion, the legislation contains temporal limits 
as to those transactions that may effectively be impugned. Moreover, only those 
entitled to apply under such legislation will have the ability to undermine through 
the legislation any mutual wills agreement. The issue will also not arise where the 
deceased has made provision for the claimant.  
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Perhaps most importantly, it must be recalled that disinheriting a person is not the 
sole reason why mutual wills are executed. As discussed above, more often the 
focus is upon binding the survivor to pass property to the ultimate beneficiaries. 
Testator family maintenance legislation does not negate the obligations mutual wills 
may impose on a surviving spouse to, for example, bequeath property to his/her 
step children. 
 
VII ISSUES PERTAINING TO PROVING MUTUAL WILLS 
Many issues pertaining to proving mutual wills have already been addressed above. 
Nevertheless, this part of the article focuses on a few key issues pertaining to prov-
ing mutual wills. From the outset it is important to note that the courts have stressed 
that the burden of proving mutual wills is no greater than the balance of probabili-
ties required in all civil cases. 76 There must be “clear and satisfactory” evidence 
that the wills were executed pursuant to an “agreement or understanding” that the 
property was to be “dealt with in a particular way for the benefit of a third per-
son”.77 In Re Cleaver 78 Nourse J stressed that the “clear and satisfactory” test “does 
not mean that there has to be a departure from the ordinary standard of proof re-
quired in civil proceedings. I have to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that 
the alleged agreement was made.”79 
Nevertheless, a number of important cautionary points regarding proving mutual 
wills should be noted. In an often cited passage Latham CJ stated in Birmingham v. 
Renfrew:80  
Those who undertake to establish an agreement assume a heavy burden of 
proof. It is easy to allege such an agreement after the parties to it have both 
died, and any court should be careful in accepting the evidence of inter-
ested parties upon such a question. 
Latham CJ’s comment needs to be read in its context. Where, as in that case, the 
surviving spouse is conferred an absolute interest under the will of the first testa-
tor’s, the plaintiff faces a heavy burden of proving the wills to be mutual wills. This 
is because, as noted above, such a bequeathing is prima facie inconsistent with an 
obligation to hold that property for another under an agreement for mutual wills.81 
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  See also Birmingham v. Renfrew, [1937] VLR 180, 185; (1937) 57 CLR 666, 682; Low v. Perpetual 
Trustees WA Ltd., (1995) 14 WAR 35. 
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  Re Cleaver, [1981] 1 WLR 939, 947. See also Birmingham v. Renfrew, (1937) 57 CLR 666, 681; 
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Buchanan J in Osborne v. Osborne, [2001] VSCA 228, para 28; Baird v. Smee, [2000] NSWCA 253, 
paras 8 and 10. 
 136   DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 10 NO 1 
 
Nevertheless, Latham CJ’s comment is a timely warning that if under the subject 
mutual wills agreement it is intended that the will is to confer an absolute interest 
on the survivor, that they are intended to be mutual wills need to be clearly spelt out 
in the wills and/or any contract or deed. 
Another cautionary note regarding the proving of mutual wills also comes from 
Latham CJ’s judgment in Birmingham v. Renfrew:82 
The mere fact that two persons make what might be called corresponding 
wills in the sense that the existence of each will is naturally explained by 
the existence of the other will is not sufficient to establish a binding 
agreement not to revoke wills so made. 
Again, where, as in that case, the surviving spouse had been conferred an absolute 
interest in the first testator’s property, the simultaneous execution of the wills by the 
testator and testatrix is not in itself indicative of mutual wills as the conferral of an 
absolute interest in the property on the survivor is inconsistent with the obligations 
that stem from mutual wills.83 While the simultaneous execution of wills to the 
same effect is a relevant circumstance to proving mutual wills,84 it will be rare that 
such a fact might on its own support a claim for mutual wills.85 This simply reaf-
firms the need to make the parties’ intention clear. 
In regard to this last comment by Latham CJ, it is important to note that similar 
comments were made in Osborne v. Osborne but in a very different factual context 
which might indicate the statement has a wider breadth than that suggested above. 
Harper J, at first instance, stated in Osborne v. Osborne86 that “many couples join in 
making wills which reflect their joint view of the proper disposition of their prop-
erty; but in doing so they do not bind themselves not to revoke their wills or indeed 
to undertake or impose any other kind of obligation.” On appeal, Winneke P simi-
larly asserted “the fact of making identical wills will not, of itself, establishing an 
implied agreement not to revoke. This is because, as his Honour also noted, many 
husbands and wives make corresponding wills ‘by agreement’ without binding 
themselves not to revoke them. Such wills are infinitely more likely to be the prod-
uct of mutual trust and moral responsibility than a binding obligation not to re-
voke.”87 It will be recalled, however, that unlike in Birmingham v. Renfrew,88 in 
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Osborne v. Osborne89 the survivor was not conferred an absolute interest; in fact the 
surviving spouse was bequeathed no interest in the testatrix’s estate. These state-
ments thereby suggest that the simultaneous execution of wills by spouses, putting 
into effect joint intentions, will not suffice to establish mutual wills even where an 
absolute interest is not bequeathed to the survivor.90 
Finally, there is a line of authority that suggests that a contract for mutual wills 
must be proved, including a contract not to revoke the wills. Thus in Osborne v. 
Osborne91 the court at first instance required the plaintiff to establish his claim that 
the subject wills were mutual wills both in contract law and equity. Harper J as-
serted that even if the plaintiff were to prove his case in equity, this would not 
suffice as “[p]roof of the contract is [also] a necessary … condition.”92 The court 
continued:93 
The plaintiff must prove a contract, to which each of his parents was a 
party, that each would make a will which, during their joint lives, would 
not be revoked without notice to the other; and after the death of the first to 
die would not be revoked by the survivor. It is true that the plaintiff sues 
not on a contract but upon a trust. But ‘without such a definite agreement 
there can no more be a trust in equity than a right to damages at law’. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal quoted Baird and Anor v. Smee94 where “the Court 
of Appeal of New South Wales variously spoke of the ‘need to prove a legally 
binding contract’ and [Aslan v. Kopf95 where the Court asserted] ‘… a testator may 
enter into a binding contract not to revoke a will …’.”96 In Baird v. Smee,97 to 
which the Court of Appeal referred, Handley JA asserted the “need to prove a 
legally binding contract.” 
It has been suggested in earlier publications that this view is erroneous.98 It suffices 
to note here that there is a wealth of authority to support the view that the courts’ 
views are erroneous as mutual wills are enforced in equity and equity merely re-
quires, inter alia, a definite agreement, arrangement or understanding between the 
testators.99 Nevertheless, until the matter is authoritatively determined by the Aus-
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tralian courts, it is necessary to be mindful that under the above view, to prove 
mutual wills a contract and, in particular, a contract not to revoke the mutual wills 
will need to be established. Thus it will be prudent to include contractual clauses in 
the will and/or accompany the will with a contract or deed. 
 
VIII USING MUTUAL WILLS IN CONJUNCTION WITH                    
BINDING AGREEMENTS100 
Combining mutual wills with a contract or deed has to some extent been addressed 
above. It is nevertheless important to reiterate the benefits that stem from including 
contractual clauses in the wills or using a binding agreement in conjunction with 
mutual wills. First, this provides a means of making clear the testator’s/testatrix’s 
intention to execute mutual wills. This can be done through, for example, recitals 
recording the fact that “this will is a mutual will.” Similarly, this can be an effective 
way of establishing any contractual requirement to execute mutual wills. Again this 
can be done through recitals that state the mutual wills “are made in pursuance of a 
contract.” As noted above, it has been suggested that the contract include, in par-
ticular, an agreement not to revoke the wills. Establishing any contractual agree-
ment as to the irrevocability of the wills can be achieved by expressly stating that 
the parties “agree that he/she will not revoke or alter his/her will during his/her 
lifetime without their spouse’s consent.” 
A theme addressed above is particularly pertinent in this context. An accompanying 
contract/deed can make clear any obligations that the parties, particularly the survi-
vor, have to leave a will in certain terms. In this regard it is important to clarify 
whether the survivor is to be constrained as to the devolution of all their property or 
only the property of the first to die. Again, this could be used to establish any pro-
hibition the survivor is bound by not to unreasonably diminish his/her estate. Such a 
binding agreement can also make clear any obligation the recipient of an inter vivos 
transfer has in regard to any gifted asset, including any prohibition on its conversion 
or mortgaging. 
As suggested above, it may be awkward, but the issue of divorce and remarrying 
needs to be raised with clients. Once determined, the legal consequences if the 
parties divorce or separate in the course of their lifetime can be set out through an 
accompanying binding agreement that, for example, states the agreement is auto-
matically revoked in such a case. If an inter vivos transfer has occurred, it could 
also state the agreed consequences; whether that is the return of the property or its 
sale and the distribution of the proceeds. The agreement could deal with the legal 
consequences and obligations if the survivor remarries, including an agreement to 
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execute a fresh will in the same terms to avoid any uncertainty through the auto-
matic revocation of wills upon remarriage.101 
Although it has been suggested above that where severance of a joint tenancy is 
intended this should be done in the parties’ lifetime, rather than simply relying on 
equity’s severance, the agreement could also be used to establish whether the 
agreement for mutual wills is intended to sever any joint tenancy.  
Finally, any agreement can also serve to make clear any rights the parties have in 
the event of a breach. This could include provisions such as a clause confirming the 
right to specific performance. 
 
IX CONCLUSION 
Many theoretical issues pertaining to mutual wills have not been able to be can-
vassed in this article.102 Instead, the major focus has been a consideration of the 
interplay of the legal effect of mutual wills and the practical use of such wills. It is 
hoped that this discussion will assist legal practitioners in identifying those clients 
who may benefit from executing mutual wills, identifying those clients who might 
intend to execute mutual wills, advising clients as to the pros and cons of mutual 
wills and the benefits of accompanying such wills with a deed or contract. 
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